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PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS ON PRINCIPLES
As a philosophically minded historian of science, I am mainly interested
in the thought-style of whole periods; in the changes of such styles over
time; and in the reasons which can be given for their existence and
development and for the differences between the scientific thought-styles
of different cultures. This tunes me sympathetically to the idea of an
evolutionary epistemology. Comparison with other evolutionary
phenomena, particularly the phenomena of biological evolution, may
suggest analogies and models which can be tried as possible explanatory
devices even for the development of socially organized and
epistemologically coherent knowledge; it may also warn us by showing
how many pitfalls (and which sorts of pitfalls) turn up when one tries to
make causal explanations of evolutionary processes (even when »cause«
is taken in the wide, quasi-Aristotelian sense of »explaining reason«).
On the other hand, as an empirically inclined historian I am also
suspicious of the adoption of the analogy as a full-fledged model – an
adoption which tempts us not to ask, e.g.,whether the genotype-phenotype-
distinction offers something valuable to the understanding of
epistemological evolution but instead what are the analogies of these two
levels. Furthermore, a tiny devil from my past as a physicist keeps
whispering to me that when using water-waves as an analogy for acoustic
phenomena one should not look for foam in the microphones. It may be
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a soundmetaphysical principle that reality is one, and that homomorphous
structures can be expected to turn up at different levels; but its soundness
presupposes awareness that different levels are also specific, and that the
relation between shared and specific structures can only be known a
posteriori1.
According to these reflections, the best thing I can offer to a discussion
of evolutionary empistemology is probably an investigation of a concrete
historical case, locating a specific innovation of knowledge and its fate in
context – »internal« as well as »external«, with regard to a dichotomywhich
I findmisleading. On an earlier occasion I have characterized the approach
as »anthropology of mathematics« (since the investigation is in fact
concerned with mathematics), using
... a term which suggested neither crushing of the socially and
historically particular nor the oblivion of the search for possible more
general structures: a term which neither implied that the history of
mathematics was nothing but the gradual but unilinear discovery of
ever-existing Platonic truths nor (which should perhaps be more
emphasized in view of prevailing tendencies) a randomwalk between
an infinity of possible systems of belief. A term, finally, which involved
the importance of cross-cultural comparison2.
The case study is concerned with one of the few great mathematicians
of the Latin Middle Ages, Jordanus de Nemore. The choice of this figure
has the advantage for our present purpose that he is completely unknown
as a person; our only access to him goes via his works. So, one is not
tempted to replace the search for explanations by the writing of biography.
At the same time, the choice of the opus of a Medieval writer has its
costs: The localization in the total directly relevant context requires that
much material be brought together which is not otherwise found in one
place or discipline (in order not to make things completely confusing I leave
1 This question is the subject of Booß & Høyrup 1979, which investigates
a series of concrete exemplifications from the physical as well as the social
sciences.
2 Høyrup 1980:9. A more full presentation, connecting the discussion to
the problem of »quasi-Aristotelian« vs. Humean causality and to the
»externalism«-»internalism«-debate is Høyrup 1982 (in Danish).

